A 1984 review of ANL led to the closure of loss-making services, including those to North America, as well as the sale of uneconomic vessels and terminals. Fleet size was reduced from 33 vessels to 27. While returning to operating profitability ($3.3m) in 1984, ANL reported a record net loss of $67.8m brought about by extraordinary write-downs arising from the inadequacy of past depreciation policies, by anticipated losses in respect of vessels to be sold in the 1984/85 financial year, and by losses in foreign-exchange transactions. Accumulated losses now exceeded capital and reserves by $3.7m. Once again ANL was technically bankrupt; the Commonwealth govern ment bailed out the Line with an additional capital injection of $70.5m.
In 1988 die ANL (Conversion into Public Company) Bill provided for die con version of die Commission's capital ($196m) into one-dollar shares, all of which were to be held by die Commonwcaldi. ANL was now required to prepare a corporate plan, work towards an overall financial target agreed to by die Minister, pay an annual dividend, and revalue its assets at least every five years.
Despite managerial inidadves aimed at increasing efficiency, ANL's financial per formance deteriorated in die early 1990s. Under its 1989/92 corporate plan, ANL:
• disposed of die two remaining Cape-size bulk carriers, acquired in die mid-1970s and employed carrying iron ore and coal to Japan;
• ordered two 2,700 twenty-foot equivalent units (teu) container ships for die Asian trades and two vessels for its Bass Strait service, enabling die lin e to benefit from advanced technology and reduced manning levels;
• merged its fleet management operadons widi diose of Associated Steamships to form ASP Ship Management;
• established a Joint Management Group widi P&O to manage dieir combined in terests in die UK/Europe to Australia and New Zealand trade; and
• entered into joint terminal ventures, including National Terminals (Australia) Ltd and Brisbane Gateway Terminals Ltd.
These inidadves effectively separated core commercial shipping operadons from as sociated ship operation, terminal, cargo handling, and shore-based transport opera dons. Notwidistanding diese inidadves, die ANL Group incurred negative earnings be fore interest and tax of $37m in 1991/92, $7m in 1992/93 and $25m in 1993/94. The Board attributed die disappointing results to several factors, including poor trading conditions during the recession of die late 1980s and early 1990s; high interest pay ments stemming from die cost of re-equipment and die Commonwealth's failure to provide promised additional equity funding; and die costs of preparing for privatisa tion. In 1993/94 ANL reported a record net loss of $ 129m, including one-off restruc turing costs and asset write-downs totalling over $100m. Prominent among the re structuring costs were provision for redundancy payments and a loss on the sale of ANL's shareholding in Australian Stevedores, while die Line also wrote-down die value of goodwill and conference carrying rights in various overseas trades.
Competition in the Shipping Industry
ANL's poor financial performance has been ascribed to several factors. Among these is the intense competition in both liner and bulk shipping markets during the past two decades. Such competition arguably stems from bodi cyclical and structural causes. Shipping is a 'feast or famine' business. In good years, excess demand for shipping tonnage sharply increases freight rates in die bulk trades. Profits earned in such booms enable owners to survive dirough die lean years, when the rate of growth of world seaborne trade slackens and when ships ordered in die previous boom continue to add tonnage to die world lleet In such periods 'too many ships chase too few car goes' and freight rates fall. Though ANL's profits/losses have varied across die cycle, as have those of odier owners, profits earned in die booms have been insufficient to counter losses made in the lean years.
Major structural changes have occurred in shipping markets over die past quarter century. In the liner trades, escalating cargo-handling costs led to die introduction of purpose-built container vessels and associated cargo-handling equipment; labourintensive cargo handling was replaced by a capital-intensive system. The entry of new lines, especially diose of entrepreneurial Asian sliipowners, intensified competition, forcing shipowners to seek cost savings dirough die introduction of larger vessels, die adoption of new types and patterns of service, and die minimisation of port calls. Thus, economies of vessel size have led to die introduction of large 'diird' and 'fourth' generation container ships (up to 5,(KK)teu capacity) where cargo volumes permit; shipowners have increased vessel utilisation by developing 'round-the-world' and 'pendulum' services; and port calls are limited to 'hub' jiorts, in which cargo is brought into and distributed f rom such ports by feeder vessels. Large diird and fourth genera tion container ships now operate high-intensity services between North America, Europe and Asia, die diree major trade generating regions of die northern hemi sphere. Intense competition between shipping lines ensures diat freight rates reflect die economies of vessel size. Australian overseas trade increasingly tends to flow into Asian hubs for on-carriage to Eurojie and America, direatening die traditional direct services to UK/Europe and North America.
A Poorly Defined and Ill-Focused Strategy
T o survive in diis competitive and fast-changing world, a shipping line must pursue a strategy valued by die market and compatible widi its distinctive competences. Ar-guably, AN L has followed inappropriate strategies lor a small line operating in a highcost economy.
T he Commonwealth government encouraged ANL to enter die Australia-Europe liner trade. Though supporting containerisation, the government feared that it might strengthen the monopoly power of die conference lines. The government sought to gain an insight into die costs of' container operations by encouraging ANL to join one of the emerging container consortia. ANL itself favoured entry to die Australia-Japan trade; having introduced roll-on-roll-off (ro-ro) vessels to die Australian coast, the line saw an opportunity to extend this technology to a deep-sea trade. During the 1970s ANL entered several more overseas liner trades, notably Australia-North America, Australia-Soudieast Asia, and Australia-New Zealand.
ANL's overseas liner strategy was to deploy one or two vessels in a number of trades, usually operating within a consortium and invariably joining conferences. W hereas this strategy made sense in die early 1970s, when conferences were powerful and traditional trade patterns dominated, it became much less attractive in die late 1970s and 1980s given die developments in shipping markets oudined above. By die mid-1980s ANL's overseas liner strategy made litde sense, since die line had failed to build a commanding strategic position in any of the trades in which it operated. The market conditions prevailing in die 1980s and 1990s mean diat an undifferentiated, poorly focused liner service is unlikely to prove profitable.
Given its size, modest capitalisation and high-cost structure, ANL could not aspire to become a major player in container-shipping markets or a low-cost supplier of shipping services. However, ANL might reasonably have pursued eidier differentia tion or focusing strategies. Differentiation strategies involve die development of a product or service diat die finn's customers believed to be superior. The obvious diff erentiation strategy for ANL is diat based on its specialist knowledge of distribution widiin Australia. A highly efficient door-to-door transport service, offered by ANL in strategic alliance widi an Asian line, could lower die price sensitivity f acing ANL.
Focus or niche strategies stem from the assumption diat a firm is able to serve a narrow strategic market more effectively and efliciendy dian competitors following less focused strategies. Two niche strategies appear immediately attractive: die operation of a feeder container service from Australia to an Asian hub, and die development of specialist liner services catering for die peculiar needs of Australian trade (such as refrigerated-container or car-carrying services).
But, aldiough ANL's management understood die deficiencies in die line's strat egy, it lacked die funds to implement die necessary major strategic changes.
Government Interference in ANL Decision-making
Arguably, ANL's performance has been adversely affected by die actions of govern ment. T he board has not been able to operate as a commercial enterprise, free from intervention by politicians and/or bureaucrats. According to Captain Sir John W il liams (1981:212), die first chairman of die Australian Shipping Commission, Ian Sin clair, Minister of Transport in 1968-71, viewed die Australian Shipping Commission as a 'political instrument', subject to direction by die Minister and Department of Transport Bureaucrats.
As well, under Section 19 of die Australian Shipping Commission Act 1956, coastal freight rates were subject to ministerial approval. Min isterial refusal to sanction rate increases during die 1960s and 1970s led to a deterio ration in the Line's financial position (ANL, 1970:6) . Moreover, under die Wliidam Labor Government of 1972-75, ANL was viewed as a 'pacesetter' for an expanding Australian flag fleet and was encouraged to order four large bulk carriers suitable for the expanding Australia-Japan iron ore trade. Given the intensity of competition in bulk shipping, freight rates obtainable did not enable die vessels to operate profitably; ANL's financial crisis of die early 1980s in part rcllccls die losses incurred by diese vessels. But ministerial involvement in ANL decision-making was reduced following die passage of die Australian Shipping Commission Amendment Act 1983 and die 1988 Act converting ANL into a public company.
Political control over borrowing and investment has likewise influenced ANL's financial performance. T he Commonwealdi's reluctance to increase ANL's capital during its expansion into overseas markets in die 1970s led to an increase in die gear ing ratio from 1.06:1 in 1970 to 13.58:1 in 1977, sharply increasing interest payments on borrowings. More recendy, ANL's former Chairman Captain Bolidio has criti cised the government for failing to honour a commitment to provide $100m in equity to part-fund die Line's 1989 re-equipment program {D;iily Commercial News, 20 Sep tember 1994), p.176). On die odier hand, ANL has avoided die discipline diat would follow from forgoing government guarantee of its debt and having to compete for eq uity funds.
ANL management and employees have been subject to public-service conditions of employment This impedes operational llexibility and makes it difficult to maintain an appropriate incentive structure for senior management The 1988 Act converting ANL into a public company provided diat employees of die Commission would re tain die same tenns and conditions of employment still having rights under Part IV of die Public Service Act retained diose rights.
High Operating Costs under the Australian Flag
Historically, Australian flag vessels have incurred much higher costs dian dieir over seas competitors. But attempts have been made to reduce die (absolute and relative) costs of operating Australian Hag vessels.
Dissatisfaction widi die performance of ANL and, more generally, widi die high price and poor quality of coastal shipping services led to political pressure for shipping industry reform in die early 1980s. Reporting in 1982, die Crawford Committee rec ommended a 'revitalisation' package aimed at encouraging investment in modem, fuel-efficient tonnage dirough die linking of fiscal incentives to reductions in crew size (Crawford, 1982) . Under die Crawford package crew sizes fell from 33 or more to 26-29. Since crew levels remained high relative to international best practice, the Hawke Government set up the Maritime Industry Development Committee (MIDC), whose 1986 Report Moving Ahead recommended the introduction of further financial in centives to encourage owners to invest in labour-saving vessels, made possible by 'integrating' deck and engine-room crews. Under the Ships (Capital Grants) Act 1987, later extended to 1997, such vessels qualify for a taxable grant of 7 per cent of their purchase price and owners are allowed to claim 20 per cent accelerated depreciation. Crew levels on new vessels have been reduced to 21-22 under the MIDC package; average crew size across the Australian flag fleet fell f rom 27.9 in 1989 to 22.5 in 1991 and 20.9 in 1992. But as manning levels have also fallen in other countries, Australia's relative competitiveness has improved only marginally. Moreover, measuring relative competitiveness by reduction in crew size tends to overstate the improvement in Aus tralia's position. Under Australian award conditions, seamen enjoy relatively generous leave provisions, implying that an Australian vessel trading year round must employ 2.1-2.2 crews per vessel as against an OECD average of 1.6-1.7, and owners incur high capital costs to provide accommodation of mi acceptable standard.
Improvements in manning levels are not of themselves sullicient to create a fully competitive Australian shipping industry, since manning costs account for only 8-10 per cent of the total costs incurred by a coastal vessel (Payne, 1994) . The Australian Shipowners Association (1995:32) has argued that the creation of a fiscal regime com parable to those enjoyed by major shipowning nations is a necessary condition for the long-term survival of an Australian flag fleet The settlement of the September 1994 waterfront strike over the sale of ANL included concessions by government that al lowed seamen employed in Australian llag ships trading overseas to be exempt from income tax.
Does Australia Need a National Shipping Line?
Does the case for a national line hinge solely on profitability? Does a national line confer benefits above and beyond the bottom line? Supporters of national shipping lines have advanced different arguments lor them.
'W indow into conferences ' and/or instruments for the control o f monopoly.
W ith a cost structure markedly higher than those of many of its competitors, ANL has al ways chosen to operate widiin conferences. H ie need to obtain information relating to conference pricing and investment decisions underpinned ANL's entry to the European trade. Yet the line's commercial interests conflict with its use as a 'window into conferences'. Conferences exerted considerable market power in the 1950s and 1960s. But today's liner trades arc highly competitive. Moreover, conferences are unlikely to regain their earlier market power, file share of trades held by conference members has shrunk; independent non-conference lines and consortia offer genuine and viable alternatives to conference services. The power of shippers has increased at die expense of shipowners; die flexibility and ease of transhipment of containers en ables diem to be moved along a variety of paths, enhancing competition. Shippers are aware of price/quality trade-offs and f reight forwarders seek to 'make a buck' by offer-ing new products and services. And public policy favours competition rather than collusive action.
Balance of payments effects.
Research has shown that domestic-flag vessels operating profitably make a positive contribution to the current account of die balance of pay ments (Centre for Transport Policy Analysis, 1988; Appelbaum, 1988; BTCE, 1988) . However, diis contribution is a limited one. Vessels are usually purchased and fi nanced abroad; the majority of vessels trading internationally are drydocked and re paired overseas; and die profitability of vessels engaged in overseas trading is usually low. In any case, profitability (rate of return on funds invested) radier dian balance-ofpayments gains is die ultimate determinant of an industry's viability; die ability to achieve an acceptable rate of return on capital provides die economic justification for further investment The rate of return on ANL investment in overseas shipping ap pears low compared widi die rate of return reported in odier industries.
Employment creation. Does the employment created widiin die Australian shipping industry warrant government support and/or subsidies? Viewed from die perspective of die industry and die maritime unions, subsidisation is die price of maintaining a potentially valuable pool of skills. However, subsidisation of such a capital-intensive industry is an extremely expensive way of creating jobs. National security. National-llag vessels may be an asset from a defence or national security standpoint ro-ro vessels widi die ability to land troops and equipment at for ward beach heads could be employed in die event of regional conflict; cellular con tainer vessels and bulk carriers could be used as launching pads for helicopters. A national fleet would also provide a nucleus of vessels to carry essential imports and exports in time of war. However, such vessels are normally available for charter. And die fact diat certain types of vessels may prove usef ul for defence purposes does not justify die general subsidisation of die shipping industry.
As Richard Goss (1994:30) has noted, it is difficult to find any dieoretical argu ments to justify general support for a national shipping line or, indeed, a shipping in dustry:
Shipping is not necessary to promote overseas trade; it is not an infant indus try; investment in it has no sjiecial effects on die balance of payments; as a capital intensive industry it provides little employment; diere is no general case for protecting shipping for defence reasons; and, as a way of buying na tional prestige, it can become very expensive.
Privatisation: The Options
In June 1991 the Commonwealdi government obtained Labor Party approval for die sale of 49 per cent of ANL; maritime union agreement was reportedly conditional upon a $100m capital injection to assist in re-equipping and modernising ANL's fleet Although the anticipated proceeds from the sale of 49 {>er cent of ANL were included in the 1992-93 Budget papers, press rc|K>rts suggest that little interest was shown by potential purchasers, whether domestic or foreign.
T he value of ANL is hody disputed. A 1992 report by Potter Warburg/Price W aterhouse argued diat ANL's value lay between $171m and minus $127m (The Australian, 24 August 1994). In contrast, the 'due diligence' study undertaken by Salomon Brodiers/Price Waterhouse reported in August 1994 diat ANL's 'indicative' value lay between minus $74.8m and minus $ 117.8m (The Age, 27 August 1994). The latter report apparendy valued ANL on a 'fire-sale' basis radier dian as a going concern, which accounts for die markedly lower values placed on vessels and fixed equipm ent
Reacting to die Salomon Brodiers/Price Waterhouse valuation, Laurie Brereton, die Minister of Transport, declared in August 1994 diat 'you couldn't give it [ANL] away, diat's the reality' (The Australian, 24 August 1994). Mr Brereton immediately replaced ANL's board of directors, appointing former New South Wales Labor Premier Neville W ran to chair a new four-member board charged widi producing a plan for die Line's reconstruction.
Union concerns over die future of ANL were heightened in early September 1994 when Mr Brereton announced diat ANL's 25 per cent stake in Australian Steve dores would be sold to Jamison Equity. The Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) dien called a strike which effectively shut down Australian ports. Union leaders let it be known diat diey had a mandate from dieir members to maintain bans for several weeks if they did not receive satisfactory assurances regarding die future of ANL.
In September 1994 die government changed tack and announced an industry assistance package diat exempted from income tax die salaries and wages of Australian seamen employed on vessels trading overseas, confirmed diat cabotage would be re tained, and pledged to restructure ANL as an economically viable enterprise, while rejecting a proposal from die Shipping Industry Reform Audiority to allow foreign ratings on Australian ships engaged in international trading. The MUA now aban doned its objective ol retaining ANL in public ownership; and die government an nounced diat ANL would be offered for sale dirough an 'open-tender' process, con ditional upon die new owners retaining die vessels under die Australian flag.
In principle, a range of options is available to die government.
Stock-exchange float ANL's poor financial performance, die likelihood of further losses if die line continues to operate its present mix of services, and die need to inject substantial funds in order to pursue more realistic strategies rule out a stock-exchange float in die foreseeable future. Trade sale. A trade sale has emerged as one of die preferred options. During late 1994 and early 1995 die new board reportedly held negotiations widi several potential purchasers, including die Bridsli P&O Group, die American-owned Sea-Land, and the French-controlled Australia New Zealand Direct lin e (ANZDL). P&O has strong historical links widi die Australia/Europe liner trade which it continues to serve in alliance widi Contship Container Line. Over the past decade P&O has been strengthening its strategic posidon in several Australian overseas liner trades. In addition to die European trade, P&O now operates in die AustraliaSoutheast Asia, Australia-East Asia, Australia-Middle East, Australia-Nordi America, and trans-Tasman trades. Given P&O's market share in key trades, acquisition of ANL might attract die attention of die Trade Practices Commission.
Sea-Land has withdrawn from contention following die rejection of its initial bid. The Line may retain an interest in entering a strategic alliance widi a restructured ANL.
ANZDL took part in a 'due diligence' process but ultimately declined to submit a bid for ANL, leaving P&O as the only trade bidder as of August 1995. The sale of ANL to P&O -for under $20m -is said to be die preferred option of senior min isters.
Retention o f present ownership (with or without equity injection). Retention of ANL, which appeared unlikely earlier in 1995, is now back on die political agenda. W hile the government may prefer to sell ANL to P&O, it may also wish to avoid die politically damaging waterfront strike diat seems likely to accompany its sale. Minister Brereton has signalled diat, if die sale to P&O is ruled out, die government would be forced to consider a major restructure of die Line (The Australian Financial Review, 10 August 1995). ANL management has reportedly prepared two restructuring op tions. Option A envisages ANL wididrawal from die Australia-Europe container trade; the sale of ANL's 50 per cent share in Coastal ExpressLine to Union Shipping; die sale of non-core land-and technology-based businesses; and a reduction in die size of corporate HQ. Option B builds on Option A, widi ANL wididrawing also from die trans-Tasman trade and selling the two vessels currendy employed in diat trade. Option B would imply a signilicandy scaled-down ANL, focusing on die Asian and (to a more limited extent) die Australian coastal trades. In effect, Option B converts ANL to a niche operator in die Asian trades.
Management and/or union buy-out. In September 1994 die MUA proposed die formation of a consortium to acquire a majority interest in ANL. The American ocean carrier Sea-Land and Australian transport group Linfox were mentioned as possible partners. The proposal appears to have been abandoned.
Merger with ' like-minded' line. This option was preferred by ANL management in die late 1980s and early 1990s. The search for a 'like-minded' line interested in merging widi or purchasing a minority interest in ANL foundered when die most likely candidate, K-Line, ruled out acquisition of a significant shareholding (Daily Commercial News, 9 October 1991).
Package and sale o f separate businesses. Arguably, ANL's businesses might yield better prices if sold separately. ANL's conference shares in, say, the UK/European trade may be valuable to a line interested in building market share, while ANL Intermodal may be of interest to a firm introducing or enhancing a door-to-door transport service. For the approach to be successful, imaginative packaging and accurate pricing of the individual businesses would be critical. Politically, such an approach could be difficult to sustain, given that the purchaser of, say, ANL conference rights in the UK/Europe trade might not be interested in purchasing the ANL vessels currendy operating in the trade. Even if willing to purchase them along with the cargo rights, a purchaser might be reluctant to operate diem widi Australian crews.
Sale o f non-core assets. Arguably, many non-core assets have already been sold. Should ANL continue under government ownership, further disposal of non-core assets would be dependent on a redefinition of ANL's core business.
Concluding Remarks
In September 1995 die federal government, P&O, and die maritime unions agreed to defer die decision on ANL until 31 October. P&O and die maritime unions have agreed to negotiate during diis period 'in good faidi' die industrial relations issues as sociated with die Line's sale. Should diey be unable to reach agreement, the govern ment is committed to restructure ANL.
Privatisation offers potential benefits but is also associated widi certain risks. Effi ciency gains should be experienced as a result of: die removal of constraints associated with public ownership (especially the shortage of equity capital and political and bu reaucratic interference in decision-making); superior operating efficiency; exploitation of synergies widi existing international and/or coastal shipping services; and die adop tion of superior strategies. ANL's goodwill and conference-carrying rights may be valuable to a line seeking to build market share in Australian liner trades.
However, the sale of ANL is unlikely to provide a windfall gain to Treasury. ANL operates twelve vessels, only four of which are owned outright Government insis tence diat diey continue to employ Australian crews, under Australian award condi tions, will lessen dieir attractiveness to potential buyers, aldiough die September 1994 reform package reduces die cost penalty.
W ould competition increase as a result of ANL privatisation? T he answer is un clear. ANL is a very small player in international shipping markets. In die long run, the level of competition in Australia's overseas liner trades will depend on die supplydemand balance in container shipping and die further development of padis through wliich liner cargoes can be routed. Sale of ANL to a company already holding a sub stantial market share in one or more of our overseas trades would strengthen that company's strategic position in die short run. Retention o f ANL may appear die least cosdy option politically. However, it will cost die federal government a great deal o f money cidier to restructure die line or to keep ANL operating in ils present form. Restructuring along die lines of ANL man agement's Option B would put in place a coherent strategy. However, in die absence o f further reform o f shipping and die waterfront, profitability could not be guaranteed. Nor should restructuring be viewed as a cheap option. Repositioning ANL would require substantial investment in vessels and equipment, as well as a willingness to carry losses until such time as die lin e is effectively repositioned in die market
